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This paper attempts to construct a broader measure of welfare that takes in account the
access people have to some public goods. If the data on household access to public goods
and private assets is assumed to be the result of a maximization problem, a latent indirect
utility level may be estimated by some factor model. In this paper the individual measure
of welfare is constructed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in the ownership of
private assets and the existence of public goods in the neighborhood the agent lives in. The
resulting welfare distributions are used in di⁄erent analysis: Calculate the treatment e⁄ect
of having access to certain public goods; investigate the e⁄ects of public goods in poverty
and inequality alleviation; development of an algorithm to locate public goods in order to
maximize some social welfare function.
Abstract
No artigo tenta-se construir uma medida para o bem estar social que leve em conta o
acesso que os agentes tem a bens pœblicos. Se os dados domiciliares de consumo de bens
durÆveis e o local do domic￿lio sªo resultado de uma escolha ￿tima dos agentes, pode-se usar
um model de fatores para se estimar o n￿vel latente de bem estar associado a essa escolha.
Neste artigo usa-se o o mØtodo de Componentes Principais sobre dados de consumo de bens
durÆveis e informa￿oes sobre a existencia de bens pœblicos na vizinhan￿a onde os domic￿lios
estªo localizados para se construir uma medida mais ampla de bem estar. A distribui￿ªo
de bem estar obtida Ø utilizada em diferentes exerc￿cios: CÆlculo do "Treatmente E⁄ect"
do acesso a certos bens pœblicos; Investiga￿ªo dos efeitos do acesso a bens publicos sobre
medidas de pobreza e desigualdade; Desenvolvimento de um algor￿tmo para se instalar um
novo bem publico de forma a maximizar alguma fu￿ªo do bem estar social.
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1 Motivations
The concept of welfare is related to some weighting to a multiplicity of features that determines
the living standards of agents in an economy. In a more concrete way, we could say that the
welfare of a society is derived from a bundle of goods and services consumed by its individuals.
In Economics the welfare that an individual enjoy is summarized by an abstract measure called
utility.
When people do welfare analysis, for example measuring poverty, inequality, they use mea-
sures of household income or consumption as a proxy to the unobservable utility distribution.
1Unfortunately, in this kind of analysis the utility people derive form the utilization of public
goods is not captured. That is, having access to public goods like schools, hospitals, roads etc.
has an impact on the utilities of the agents, and a measure of welfare should capture that. So,
in order to have better and more robust estimators to poverty and inequality we should try to
incorporate the information on the individual access to public goods in our analysis.
Another topic very stressed in the literature is the measurement of the value each individual
attribute to a given public good. As public goods are in general ￿nanced by taxes, we do not
have a clear measure of public good￿ s price. In the literature many strategies have been tried to
estimate the individual willingness to pay for a public good: use of surveys that ask households
directly about their the valuation of the public good; hedonic methods that assume that the
price of land or housing is a function of the amenities of the neighborhood.
The goal of this paper is to construct a measure of the individual welfare that incorporate
in some sense the utility derived from the consumption of public goods. We argue that such
a measure of welfare would allow us to perform a more accurate welfare analysis. Once this
broader measure of welfare is constructed it would be possible to estimate the individual gain
in terms of welfare of having access to a given set of public goods. In this sense, the objectives
of this paper are the construction of a broader measure of welfare that incorporates in some
way the utility derived by the consumption of public goods. After such a measure is created
the following exercises may be performed: Analyze the impact of public goods in poverty and
inequality dynamics; calculate the "treatment e⁄ect" of having access to certain public goods;
￿nd the optimal geographical position of a public good according to some social welfare function.
We argue that the development of such techniques may be very useful for policy evaluation.
In this sense , it is pointed out here that the paper raises some interesting questions and our
hope is that we can provide some good answers.
1.1 Theoretical Background
In order to perform empirical studies about welfare, poverty and inequality, it is necessary to
have a welfare indicator for each household. That is, it is necessary to measure the utility of the
agents in some way. The way it is usually done in the economic literature is the construction of
a money metric indicator of welfare. There are two major money metric indicators used empir-
ically: household income or its consumption expenditure. The use of income (or consumption
expenditure) as an approximation of utility is justi￿ed as follow: Consumers maximize their
utility function subject to some budget constraint. From the consumers￿maximization problem
we can derive his expenditure function as
e(p;u) = Min p:x st u(x) > u￿
where u stands for the utility level, x is a bundle of consumption goods, and p is its respective
price vector.
In this sense, e(p;u) is the minimal cost necessary to obtain some level of utility, for a given
price vector p. But from the same maximization problem, we can show that for a given vector of
goods x we can ￿nd an associated level of utility u(x). Then, we can construct a money metric
utility function from the prices and quantities consumed by the agent in the following way
m(p;x) = e(p;u(x))
Note that m(:) has the same properties that the expenditure function, and for a given price
vector it is a monotonic transformation of the utility function: the bigger the m(:) the larger
the utility. In this context, income (or consumer expenditure) are justi￿ed as a valid welfare
indicator.
2Note that in the previous analysis no explicitly assumption was made about the role of public
goods in the welfare indicator. So if one uses measures of income or expenditure in market goods
as proxy of welfare the obtained measure may not be correctly capturing the well-being of the
individuals.
Di⁄erent models used in the literature try to account to public goods in the welfare of agents.
If data on the use and the cost of usage of public goods is available, we could then mimic the
money metric utility model. In this set up agents consume market goods x and use some public
goods g. The utilization of the public good has a cost denoted by d. Then the consumer￿ s
expenditure function would be given by
e(p;u) = Min p:x + d:g st u(x;g) > u￿
and the correspondent money metric utility would be
m(p;d;x;g) = e(p;d;u(x;g))
In this framework it is easy to see that in constructing an empirical proxy of the money metric
utility one should try to input the value of the utilization of public goods for each individual.
Another possibility is to measure the welfare derived by the consumption of public goods
using an hedonic approach. In this case the assumption is that the prices of some goods like land
or housing re￿ ect some quality these goods have. In particular, the price of land (or housing)
could be re￿ ecting the proximity to di⁄erent public goods. So one would expect to observe a
higher price of land in a neighborhood where there are plenty of public goods available. On the
other hand, everything else constant, the price of the land would be lower in a neighborhood or
village located far from public goods. Using such a model it could be possible to capture in a
money metric welfare indicator the utility derived by the consumption of public goods. At the
same time it could be possible to estimate the value each individual or household attribute to a
given set of public goods.
Both the models described above have very appealing qualities, however they require a very
detailed data base to allow for their implementation. This paper tries to develop a di⁄erent
model to construct a broader measure of welfare including the access people have to public
good. The idea here is to extend the models that try to overcome the absence of expenditure
data using information on the ownership of assets by households. Such models as Filmer and
Pritchett (1998) rank households using data only on the assets they own. Filmer and Pritchett
main assumption is that the ownership of a given asset is a function of a set of parameters and
what they call the "long term wealth". In this sense, it would be possible to estimate this latent
"long term wealth" in the absence of expenditure data by using some factor model in the asset
ownership data. The model developed in the next section tries to justify this approach and allow
for a more general set of assets.
2 A Simple Model
Suppose the researcher observes data on the ownership of individual assets. Suppose also that
there is data for the existence of public goods in the neighborhood (or village) the household lives
in. Let￿ s assume that the bundle of assets we observe is the result of the household￿ s optimal
choice. Assume the bundle household h living in village v consumes has the following form
Xiv = (x1;:::;xk;Gv)
where (x1;:::;xk) are the assets (like TV, VCR, automobile, etc.) and G1 = (gv1;:::;gvL) are
the village v characteristics (such as schools, police station, post o¢ ce etc.). Note that observed
3bundle Xiv is a vector with coordinates that assume values of zeros or ones. In this set up the
space of commodities the household can chose within is given by
S = fXiv 2 Rk+L;Xiv is any possible combination assets x1;:::;xk and Glg
Then we see that in this model the consumer chooses the preferred bundle in a set of M = 2KL
possible bundles.
The main assumption here is that the household is choosing the bundle Xiv in order to
maximize his welfare. That is, given a set of parameters representing prices and preferences
the household is choosing optimally his portfolio of assets and the village he is living in. So
let Yi ￿ Vi(Xiv;￿) be the indirect utility of consuming the bundle Xiv, where ￿ is a vector of







Our problem then is to estimate the latent level of utility Y ￿
i = Vi(X￿
iv;￿). But as stated before
we just have data on X￿





iv￿, and then we can use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Factor Analysis to
estimate Y ￿
i . In the present paper due to time restrictions just PCA was employed,but the same
kind of analysis could be carried on using a more general factor model.
2.1 PCA
In this section we try to justify the use of the PCA as a reasonable technique to be employed in
assets and public goods index construction. Principal Component analysis is a useful statistic
technique that allows us to ￿extract from a large number of variables those few orthogonal linear
combinations of the variables that best capture the common information￿. The idea is, as we
have data on the household ownership of a set of assets, and we also have information about the
existence of some public goods in the village where each household is located, we can construct
a welfare index using the PCA. Suppose we have data on k assets households hold. Then
X0 = [X0
1;:::X0
k], where the n-dimensional vector X0
k represents the the ownership of asset k by
the households in the population. The main assumption here is that the ownership of the assets




X = f(Y ;￿) (1)
and
Cov(Yi;Yj) = 0 i 6= j
In particular we assume that the latent variable Y1; that accounts for the greater source of
variance in X, is a proxy for the long term welfare households experience. In this context if we
are interested in measuring the latent variables we would like to ￿nd
Y = V (X;￿) (2)
Let￿assume that the relation between X and Y is the following
X = ￿Y
where ￿ is a (kxk) non singular matrix. Then we can write
Y = ￿X








Yp = ￿1kX1 + ::: + ￿kkXk = ￿
0
kX
Assuming without loss of generality (WLOG) that X has mean zero we de￿ne





















where the last restriction is necessary to guarantee that the variance of Y j is not arbitrarily
big. Note that without this last restriction one could make the variance of Yj arbitrarily big by
multiplying ￿j by a constant.
Claim 1 Let ￿ = E[XX0]. Let (￿1;e1);:::(￿k;ek) be the eigenvalue and eigenvector pairs asso-
ciated with ￿, and ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿k. Then
￿





Yj = e1jX1 + ::: + ek1jXk = e0
jX
Proof. Let (￿1;e1);:::(￿p;ep) be the eigenvalue and eigenvector pairs associated with ￿: Then
for all j we have by de￿nition






Corollary 2 From the previous result we have
V ￿ ￿11 + ::: + ￿kk =
k X
i=i




Proof. It was shown that V ar(Xi) = ￿ii. Then
k X
i=i
V ar(Xi) = ￿11 + ::: + ￿kk. At the same
time







1j￿11 + ::: + 2e1jekj￿kj + ::: + e2
kj￿kk
5But as e0
iej = 1 and e0














11 + ::: + e2
1k
￿










V ar(Yi) = (1)￿11 + ::: + 2(0)￿k1 + ::: + (1)￿kk = ￿11 + ::: + ￿kk
So we see that the ￿rst component accounts for the biggest share of the variance of the
population ￿1
V : In this sense we can reinterpret the PCA problem. We can say that the principal
component is the single linear combination of the assets [X0
1;:::X0
k] that accounts for the biggest
share of the variance of the population.


















with ￿0￿ = ￿￿0 = I. Then we have
Y = ￿X , X = ￿0Y





where Xiv = (xi1;:::;xik;gv1;:::;gvL). So using the PCA approach described above we construct
a welfare index such that
Yiv = b1xi1 + ::: + bkxik + ￿1gv1 + ::: + ￿lgvl
where ￿ = (b;￿)
Note that in this simple model it was assumed that the household is choosing optimally its
assets and the public goods it consumes. Then the latent utility level given by Y ￿
i = X￿
iv￿ is
estimated as linear combination of assets that accounts for the biggest share of the variance in
the data.
62.2 Exercises
Once we have calculated the welfare measure for each individual we will use this distribution to do
di⁄erent analysis. First we can use the welfare distribution to calculate poverty and inequality
index. Using the model described above we can compare poverty and inequality index if we
account or not for public goods. In this sense, we can estimate the impact of a given public
good in some aggregate welfare measure. Other possible exercise is to decompose poverty and
inequality by village and by access to public goods. Following this approach we could be able
to identify if the existence or the lack of a given set of public goods is a source of poverty and
inequality.
This model also allows us to calculate the treatment e⁄ect of having access to public goods.
The idea is that we could model the choice of the village the household is located as a discrete
choice problem. In this context, if we observe a household that is located in a village not endowed
with public good k we could try to identify the welfare gain this household obtains from having
this public good in his village. To do this we need to ￿nd the counterfactual utility level for this
household. That is, we have to estimate the utility the household would have if in his village
there were public good k.
Finally, as we constructed a welfare distribution that is a function of the public goods villages
have, we can construct counterfactual distributions of welfare by placing a given public good in a
village that does not have this public good. For each of these counterfactual distributions we can
calculate the associated aggregate welfare measured by a social welfare function. Following this
method we chose the village to place an extra public good in order to maximize the aggregate
welfare.
2.2.1 Welfare Analysis
1. Poverty: For a given poverty line z we can calculate di⁄erent measures of poverty using
the formula shown bellow. High values of ￿ imply that the poverty gaps on the left tail of
the welfare distributions are more important.













We can also decompose the total measure of poverty in a weight sum of the contribution








2. Inequality: Using the data we constructed on welfare Yi we can also construct di⁄erent















where the greater the parameter ￿ the bigger is the weight given to income di⁄erences in









7Using our estimated distribution of welfare we are going to decompose the inequality. The
formula for the inequality decomposition for a given inequality measure I is
I = WI + BI
where the within-group inequality WI is the sum of subgroup inequality levels (weighted
by the population shares of subgroups). BI stands for the inequality between groups.
3. Finally, can test the stochastic dominance for di⁄erent distributions of welfare. That is,
we can rank distributions of welfare that take or not in account individual access to public
goods.
2.2.2 Calculate "The Treatment E⁄ect"
Using the welfare distribution we will calculate the "treatment e⁄ect" of accessing a public good.
Following the treatment e⁄ect literature we could write the Average Treatment e⁄ect of having
access to a given public good as
ATE(X;gk) = E[Yiv ￿ Yi~ v]
where Yiv is the outcome of someone that has access the public good gk, and Yi~ v is the
outcome of an agent that has no access to the public good gk. In this multiple outcome discrete
model the expression for the treatment on the treated is given by
TT(X;gk) = E[Yiv ￿ Yi~ v=Dk = 1]
where Dk = 1 implies that treatment k was chosen. The usual problem in this literature is that
we do not observe the same household in two di⁄erent states, or with two di⁄erent treatments. In
this particular model we are going to use two di⁄erent approaches to try to identify the treatment
e⁄ect. The ￿rst one is Matching. The idea here is that if we want to measure the treatment
e⁄ect of public good k to household i, we could use as a counterfactual an household that "looks
like" household i. In this case we would compare the welfare of households that are very similar
in the ownership of private assets and have access to the same public goods but one. As the
index of welfare given by our model is
Yiv = b1xi1 + ::: + bkxik + ￿1gv1 + ::: + ￿lgvl
theTreatment on the Treated (TT) would be given by
TT(Xi;gk) = ￿kgik






Other strategy that can be used to calculate the treatment e⁄ect of a public good is the
directly construction of the counterfactual distribution of welfare assuming a di⁄erent distribution
of public goods. That is, we generate a fake data set assuming that that village v has the public
good k (in the real data village v has no public good k). Then we run PCA in this fake data
set and calculate the welfare index for each individual. So bu simply inputting a counterfactual
distribution of the public good we calculate the resulting counterfactual distribution of welfare
Y vC
i = bc
1X1i + ::: + bc
nXni + ￿c
1gc
1v + ::: + ￿c
kgc
kv
8Then, given the original data on assets and public good and the fake data on public good we
can calcutate the TT in the following way
TT(Xi;gv;gc
v) = Y v
i ￿ Y vC
i












We could also aggregate the treatment e⁄ect by village.
2.2.3 Placing The Public Good




































Note that the choice of an especifc functional form for the SWF will be always arbitrary. This
choice will depend on the society￿ s degre of the aversion to inquality. That is, the more concave
the functions f() and g(:) the biggest will be the lost of welfare due to inequality.
Once we have a SWF we are able to write an algorithm to place the public good in the
following way:
Suppose we want tho chose the location of the public good gk. Note that some villages have
already access to this public good. So WLOG assume that our problem is choose a village in
the sub set of V ￿ = fv1;::::vLg where there is no public good gk available. Then the algorithm
is given by the following steps
1. Place the public good gk in village 1. Run PCA for the entire economy.
2. Find the new contrafacutual welfare distribution
3. Using the resulting contrafacutual welfare distribution calculate the ￿ W(1), that is the value
of the SWF if the public good is placed in village 1
4. Repeat steps 1,2 and 3 for all villages
5. Chose to place the public good in the village where the SWF values is higher, that is
is such that W(v￿ ) = MaxfW(v1);:::W(vL)g
9The algorithm developed above chooses to place an extra public good k in village v￿ because
the welfare of the society, measured by an aggregation of Yiv will be maximized if the extra public
good is placed there. But note that in doing that we are not taking in account any information
about the spatial distributions of the pubic goods. We can then add more structure to this
problem to obtain more interesting results.
Suppose when placing public goods in villages we also want to take in account geographic
conditions. So, we could take in account variables like the number of people would be able to use
the public good; distances from other villages, cost of transportation between villages etc. In this
sense, we would be assuming that the "real" social welfare of placing a public good in village vl
would be a function of the the social welfare W(vl) described above, and also a function of some
geographical conditions Z(vl): Then the aggregate welfare of placing public good k in village v
would be giving by
F(vl) = F(Z(vl);W(vl))
In this context, we would chose the village to place the public good in order to maximize this
function, that is,
v￿ is such that F(v￿) = MaxfF(v1);:::F(vL)g
It should be note that the biggest problem in implementing this algorithm is to choose a
reasonable functional form to the function F(:) and pick sensible variables Z.
3 Data
In order to implement the methods described above we are going to use data on household
and villages in Thailand. Three data bases were combined in this e⁄ort to incorporate the
consumption of public goods in the household welfare indicator: CDD, Townsend Thai Data and
Felkner Distances Data.
The Community Development Dept (CDD) data set was collected by Rural Development
Committee (RDC) at the village level. CDD is a section of the Thai Ministry of the Interior, and
it is responsible for the health and well being of Thai citizens. This data set consists of several
questions answered by CDD o¢ cials and village headmen concerning household characteristics,
education, health and sanitation, the environment and public equipment. This 1996 data base
was used to access the existence of public goods as schools, health care center, and police station
in each village
The Townsend Thai is a very detailed household level survey. The data was collected in
two provinces in the Northeast part of the country and two provinces in the more industrialized
central corridor, around Bangkok. In each of those provinces, 48 villages were sampled, and
in each village 15 households were surveyed. The sample excludes urban households. The
questionnaire includes detailed information of household characteristics such as sources of income
and expenditure, education, asset ownership, occupation etc. This 1997 survey was used to
construct measures of household welfare using asset ownership
The so called Felkner Distances data consists in the geo-location of the villages in the space.
This data also contains information on distances (measured in a straight line, and timed in
minutes when using the road system) from the villages to the district centers. At the district
centers we can assume that there are a set of public goods such as schools, hospitals and so on.
Using this data it is also possible to calculate the distances any household is from any public
good. So this data base is used to construct a measure of the cost of accessing public goods as
detailed above.
The process of combining the data sets is the following: For each household in Townsend
Thai data base we have the information about the village he lives in. Using this information we
10can attribute to each household a bundle of public goods consumed, or measures of distances
to the di⁄erent public goods (these distances will be zero if the public goods are located in the
village the household is located in). In the resulting data base we have for each household data
on his consumption, education, asset ownership, public goods in his villages, and distances to
public goods and so on.
4 Some Empirical Results
The ￿rst problem we face when we try to construct an individual welfare measure based on
private assets and public goods the choice of assets and the public goods that will compose the
index. The problem is that we don￿ t have a model to base our choice: the choice will be arbitrary.
It is important to notice that following our model, Y iv is the latent indirect utility of household
i locate at village v. And it is estimated by PCA as the single component of the matrix of assets
and public goods that accounts for the biggest share of the variance of data. So, we have a trade
o⁄ when choosing the set of assets and public goods used in the model. In one hand ,we want
a su¢ ciently big number of "goods" (assets and public goods) in order to have representative
proxy of the individual welfare. But on the other hand we want that the welfare index accounts
for a reasonable share of the variance of the data. But as the number of goods is increased the
share of variance of the index falls. So our strategy here was to try di⁄erent combinations of
"goods". The ￿nal combination was chosen based on both the variance share criterion and also
in the economic appealing of the "goods". In the appendix we show the di⁄erent models we
tried.
The ￿nal choice assets and public goods used through the paper is given in the table bellow.
Assets Public Goods
TV - Color Community public health service
VCR Basic medical treatment and reference
Air Conditioner Kindergarten school
Regular Telephone Primary school within 3km distance
Cellular Telephone Secondary school
Refrigerator Vocation training center
Motorcycle Postal service center
Car Telephone service center
Pick-up Truck Police station






List of Assets and Public Goods
4.1 Welfare Analysis
The goal of this section is to present the results of the welfare analysis detailed above for both
the so called "Asset Index" and for the so called "Welfare Index" that augments the asset index
by the inclusion of public goods.
Once the asset and welfare indexes have been constructed, we can start comparing them.
Our ￿rst problem is that both indexes have mean zero by construction. As we are interested in
measuring inequality we need a distribution with positive support. To overcome this problem
we just shift both distributions to the right by adding to each component the minimum value of
its respective distribution. Note also that both index have no speci￿c unit of measure. So from
now on we assume that that both index are measured in utility units.
11Inequality Measures Asset Index Welfare Index
Relative mean deviation 0.314 0.270
Coefficient of variation 0.803 0.689
Standard deviation of logs 1.253 0.925
Gini coefficient 0.437 0.376
Mehran measure 0.616 0.533
Piesch measure 0.347 0.298
Kakwani measure 0.175 0.129
Theil index (GE(a), a = 1) 0.337 0.235
Mean Log Deviation (GE(a), a = 0) 0.371 0.312
Entropy index (GE(a), a = -1) 2.043 0.850
(Coeff.Var. squared) (GE(a), a = 2) 0.322 0.237
Inequality in Both Models
As we start to perform some welfare analysis with the two distributions, it is easy to see that
the ￿welfare distribution￿displays less inequality than the ￿asset distribution￿for many di⁄erent
inequality measures. From Figure 1 we can see for example, that the Gini coe¢ cient associated
with the asset index is 0.43, much higher than the 0.37 calculated for the welfare index.
Note that this moderate fall in inequality in the ￿living standards￿ distribution when we
add the access to public goods could be driven by the methodology applied. Remember that to
construct the ￿welfare￿index we are combining household level data with village level data. That
is, for each household we have data on its ownership of TV, VCR, motorcycle and so on. And
for each village we have data on the existence of schools, police station, post o¢ ce etc. Then, to
all the households located in the same village we are attributing the same access to public goods.
This could be generating the observed decrease in inequality. In order to take this problem into
account we ranked all households by his relative position in its village and compared inequality
levels. Therefore, we calculated the Gini coe¢ cient among the ￿ranked one￿households in each
village, and repeated the same procedure to those ￿ranked two￿ , ￿ranked three￿and so on. In
doing that we cannot attribute the decrease in inequality to the fact we are assigning the same
level of public good access to each household in its respective village. The results presented in
the table 2 show that inequality in the asset index is greater for each household rank. Another
important feature of Figure 2 is that as we account for the public good access, inequality falls
more among the better ranked households in each village. Those results seem to imply that the
access to public goods leads to a reduction in the inequality level.
Using the asset and welfare indexes we constructed we can also calculate poverty measures.
We can show that for di⁄erent poverty lines the number of poor people in the asset distribution
is greater than in the welfare distribution. The key feature of measuring poverty in those two
distributions is not to say that the level of poverty in rural areas in Thailand is over estimated
when one uses a living standard distribution that doesn￿ t account for public goods. In contrast,
the point here is to call attention to the fact that without a living standard distribution that
takes in account public goods access, one cannot recognize the e⁄ects of public good provision in
terms of poverty alleviation. Table 3 allows us to see that using a distribution such the welfare
index could improve our capacity to analyze public policies. Another interesting feature shown
in table 3 is that the e⁄ect of the public goods seem to bigger to the poorer individuals. We
see that the di⁄erence in the in the poverty index is FGT(￿) in the assets and welfare index is













Gine Coefficients - Asset Index
vs Welfare Index
left tail for when we account public goods.
Asset Welfare Asset Welfare Asset Welfare
Z=Mean 0.578 0.552 0.314 0.270 0.236 0.176
Z=0.8*Mean 0.434 0.439 0.268 0.216 0.205 0.138
Z=0.6*Mean 0.369 0.326 0.218 0.158 0.173 0.100
Z=0.5*Mean 0.287 0.276 0.196 0.129 0.158 0.080
Z=0.4*Mean 0.283 0.226 0.174 0.099 0.143 0.060
Poverty in Both Models
Poverty Line
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2)
Tables 4 and 5 show some inequality decompositions by villages using both the assets and
the welfare index. From the tables it is easy to see that the greater source of inequality in the
data is associated with the inequality within the villages. That means that inside each village
the household living standards are relatively more unequal distributed than the living standards
between di⁄erent villages. However, it should be noted that the share of inequality between
villages gets bigger when we account for public goods. this can be a signal that the public goods
an unevenly distributed through the villages.
Inequality Decomposition by
Village - Asset Index
GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
Both Groups 2.373 0.456 0.276 0.274
Within Groups 94.9% 77.8% 66.4% 66.5%
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Asset vs Welfare index
Inequality Decomposition by
Village - Welfare Index
GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
Both Groups 0.853 0.313 0.234 0.237
Within Groups 84.6% 65.3% 57.8% 58.8%
Between Groups 15.4% 34.7% 42.2% 41.2%
In the ￿gures displayed in appendix we show the spatial distribution of poverty and inequality
in the Thai Tambons using our two models. The maps show how poverty and inequality vary in
each village when we account for public goods in the welfare indicator. The main result shown in
these maps the villages that have more poverty when we use the asset index are still the villages
with more poverty and inequality when we use the welfare index. However, in all villages the
level of poverty and inequality fall when we account for public goods.
Finally, by plotting the accumulated distributions of the asset and welfare indexes we can
see that the latter stochastic dominates in ￿rst order the former. The Saposnik theorem (1983)
shows that any increasing social welfare function will display a higher welfare in a distribution
that stochastic dominate in ￿rst order other distribution. We can then use this theorem to argue
that the ￿welfare index￿distribution displays more welfare than the ￿ asset index￿one.
4.2 The Treatment E⁄ect
As described above one objective of this paper is to use the broader distribution of welfare
estimated above to compute the treatment e⁄ect for the individuals of having access to public
goods. As described above we used two strategies to identify the treatment e⁄ect. We ￿rst used
matching. Following the strategy discussed above, in order to measure the gain a given agent
obtain from having a given public good in his village we compared his welfare with the welfare
of other agents with similar consumption of assets and public goods. The table bellow shows the









































ATE 0.149 0.184 -0.208 -0.253 -0.279 0.148 -0.302 0.417 -0.350
ATE (%) 5.49% 6.80% -7.68% -9.33% -10.30% 5.47% -11.16% 15.38% -12.91%
Treatment Effects - Matching Results
Some results obtained here a counterintuitive. We found negative average treatment e⁄ect
for some public goods. This result may be related to the way PCA assigns weights to the welfare
index. As our welfare index is the liner combination of assets and public goods that accounts for
the biggest variance in the data, it is the case that the weights on public goods that are relatively
common to all agents are negative. That means that such public goods are not explaining much
of the variation on the data. Looking to the public goods that have a positive average treatment
e⁄ect, we note that the biggest impact is associated with the Telephone Service Center (TSC).
According to the model, the average treatment e⁄ect of having access to a TCS is about 0.417
utility units, which corresponds to an increase of 15% on the average utility level. It is important
to remark that TSC is the rarest public good in our sample. About 95% of the households on
the sample have no access to this public good. This is the main reason why having access to
TSC has a so big impact on the individual welfare.
We also estimated the treatment e⁄ect using a di⁄erent approach. As stressed above we
created fake data bases where we assumed that a given village had certain public good, as in
reality it was not the case. In this sense, we constructed for each household a counterfactual
distribution of welfare where we assume we are observing the household in a di⁄erent world. So
we can directly compute the treatment e⁄ect as the di⁄erence of the actual and counterfactual
distributions. This resulting treatment e⁄ect in di⁄erent ways. In the table bellow we display
some results. The table bellow shows for example the treatment e⁄ect of having a Postal Service
Center installed in village 160. We see that households that are located in this village bene￿t
much more than that rest of population. But, this is not always the case. Again some counterin-
tuitive results appear. For example, a police station in village 155 will imply a positive treatment
e⁄ect to the entire society, but at the same time that implies a negative treatment e⁄ect to the
15Public Good/Village ATT (%) - Entire Population ATT (%) - Village Population
Telephone Service in Village 160 2.35% 12.54%
Basic Medical Tretment in  Village 101 0.33% 3.88%
Vocational Training Center in Village 36 0.05% 5.85%
Police Station in  Village 155 3.43% -14.58%
Treatment Effect  - Contrafactual Results
population of village 155. The same kind of exercise can be carried out for any village and any
public good.
A ￿nal but important remark has to be made concerning the computation of the treatment
e⁄ects displayed above. As we construct fake data and assume we are observing the agent in a
di⁄erent world, where some public good k is now located in certain village v, we are making a
huge assumption. The point is that we can not be sure that the agent would choose to consume
the same bundle of assets, or even if he would choose to live in the same village if the distribution
of public goods were di⁄erent from the observed. It may very well be the case that a given public
good is a substitute to certain set o assets or vice versa. So, we can not be sure that as we
place exogenously a public good in a given village the individual choices would be the same.
In contrast, we can try to understand the treatment e⁄ects derived here as short run e⁄ects.
That is, assuming that a public good is placed in a giving village, the treatment e⁄ect would be
measuring a short run e⁄ect, the e⁄ect before any migration or any portfolio change. In order
to obtain more robust results we should we a better model of individual choice where we model
explicitly the simultaneous choice of consumption of private and public goods.
4.3 Placing The Public Good
Using the broader welfare distribution derived above we developed an algorithm to place public
goods in villages in order to maximize a given social welfare function. For simplicity we chose to







This implies as W is maximized the average utility level of the economy is maximized. The table
bellow presents some results derived using the algorithm describe above. We see that given our
choice of W, the best village to place an extra police station would be village 155. The aggregate
welfare gain of placing a police station in this village would be 3.44%. Note that welfare gain is
calculated as the perceptual di⁄erence in the value of SWF applied to the fake data (where we
place a police station in village 155) to the value of the SWF applied to the original data. We
see that the welfare gain vary from 0.67% when a "Basic Medical Treatment" facility is installed


























Village 15 107 90 149 151 104 52 94 155
Welare Gain 0.70% 0.67% 3.47% 0.38% 7.08% 0.41% 4.17% 0.71% 3.44%
Maximum SWF - Utilitarian
It is important to mention, that the public good placement algorithm implemented here just
takes in account the individual welfare calculate by PCA. We would expect to obtain di⁄erent
16results with we used a more general model allowing for geographical variables, distance for close
public goods, transportation costs among villages and so on. In the appendix we present a map
showing the spatial location of the villages chosen to receive the extra public goods.
Again we have to remark that the analysis developed above have to be interpreted as short
run e⁄ects. That is, we have to read the results above as: in the short run, before any migration
or change in individual￿ s portfolios, social welfare would be maximized if a public good k were
placed in village v.
5 Conclusions and Possible Extentions
In this paper we tried to construct a broader measure of welfare taking in account the access
households have to public goods. A simple discrete choice model was developed to justify the use
of data on the ownership of assets and access to public goods in the construction of a broader
welfare index. It was argued, that the utilization of factor methods are suitable in the estimation
of a latent utility model derived form such simple discrete choice model. For simplicity we chose
to use PCA as the estimation method. But the same analysis could have been carried out using
a more general factor model.
In the paper we make an attempt to justify theoretically the use of Principal Component
Analysis in the construction of a wealth or welfare index (this technique has already been used
for this purpose in the literature without much justi￿cation). The technique employed has
naturally pros and cons. One of the majors advantages of the PCA approach is it simplicity.
It is relatively easy to ￿nd reliable data on asset ownership and it is still easy to ￿nd data on
the existence of public goods in neighborhoods where households are located. In contrast, this
approach relies heavily on the assumption that PCA on the ownership of assets and the access
to public goods is able to capture the variation of a latent variable identi￿ed as the long run
welfare level. Even though this assumption has been heavily used in the literature, it is still a
pretty strong assumption.
Using the techniques developed above we found some interesting results. It was shown that
distributions of "utility" that includes information on the access households have to public
goods display less poverty and inequality and bigger welfare relatively to distributions of utility
derivated form the ownership of assets. We have also shown that using a broader measure of wel-
fare the inequality between villages increases. This fact may imply that the uneven distribution
of public goods across villages is an important source of inequality in this economy.
The broader distribution of welfare was also used in the estimation of the treatment e⁄ect
of having access to public goods. Unfortunately in this session results were not so satisfactory.
Two strategies were employed to identify the treatment e⁄ect: matching and direct construction
of counterfactual distribution of welfare. In both cases we found results hard to explain, such as
negative treatment e⁄ect of having access to certain public goods. One important remark regard-
ing this session is that when we do matching or when we construct counterfactual distribution
of welfare we are making some very strong assumptions. In this sense, all the results have to be
understood in a short run context. The treatment e⁄ect we obtain by comparing the original
and a counterfactual distribution of welfare is assumed to hold only in the short run, before any
kind of migration of portfolio change. In this sense, in order to obtain more robust estimates of
treatment e⁄ects it may be necessary the construction of a more general choice model where the
simultaneous choice of private and public goods is contemplated. The use of a structural hedonic
model, where the price of housing or land is a function of the distance to public goods may solve
this problem.
The last exercise developed in the paper was the placement of public goods in order to
17maximize a social welfare function. Here again, the results obtained have to be understood in
a shot run context, as stressed above. The simple algorithm developed above can be used in a
more general model where individual welfare is not the single relevant variable for public good
placement. The analysis could be more complete if in placing public goods in villages we could
also take in account geographical and demographic variables.
But apart from the implementation problems we faced, the idea of constructing a broader
measure of welfare still seems very promising from both an empirical and theoretical point of view.
Note that the model developed here could be augmented in di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst and obvious
one would be to estimate the latent utility level using a factor model that allows for heterogeneity
among the agents. The model could be even more sophisticated if the heterogeneous agents are
spatially correlated. That is, if we make some assumption that the parameters of the model
(that represent prices end preferences) are function of the village household is located in. The
main idea is that such a model could be enlarged in some fashion to capture e⁄ects of the spatial
distribution of public goods. So far we were not able to treat space properly. As mention above,
in the exercise of the placement of the public good, we did not take in account any measure of
distances between villages. So we think the study developed here in a kind of explanatory way,
could be improved with better theoretical models and more sophisticated empirical analysis
The important point to remark is that the development of such techniques could be very help-
ful to improve public policy decisions. Once we can consistently estimate this broader measure
of welfare we will be able analyze the e⁄ects on poverty, inequality of the provision of di⁄erent
public goods. Such a technique will also allow policy makers to think about the geographical or
spatial distribution of public goods in order to maximize some social welfare function. At the
same time, as we obtain a proxy for the welfare distribution with and without taking in account
public goods, one can think about the development of a model to attribute social value for public
goods based on the di⁄erence of those two distributions.
In summary, the exercises developed above have shown, still imperfectly, that the account of
public goods in the households￿living standards may have an important e⁄ect on their welfare.
We are sure this is an interesting research topic, and we are quite con￿dent that, with better
techniques, we would be able to use the data in a more e¢ cient way, and improve the results
displayed above in future work.
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